OIL SPILL RESPONSE TEAM PREPARED FOR THE WORST

by

Robert Figueroa

Oil and water don't mix. It's a basic fact of chemistry that serves as a metaphor for all sorts of antipathies. In the case of oil spills, a corollary could be added: When oil and water meet, water loses. And so do all the creatures that live in and depend upon it for their survival.

The threat to marine and coastal environments posed by oil can be summed up in just two words: Exxon-Valdez. That catastrophic spill in 1989, involving an oil tanker which ran aground off the Alaskan coast, despoiled--in a matter of hours-- a pristine bay teeming with life, resulting in environmental and economic devastation on a massive scale. Images of blackened shores and scores of oil-stained birds, sea otters, and other dead or dying marine animals, together with the decimated fisheries and the enormous scope and costs of the clean-up effort, exemplify the risks involved in humankind's heavy dependence on oil.

But since we're unlikely to get over our addiction any time soon, oil spills promise to remain fairly common--especially around busy ports. And so will the task of containing, cleaning up, and otherwise fighting them. In the case of spills involving Navy ships in the waters adjacent to NAS Alameda, that job falls to the base's Oil Spill Response Team, one of many the Navy employs throughout the Bay Area (NSC Oakland, Treasure Island, Concord, Moffet Field and Mare Island all have teams), and other Navy ports.

Made up of Port Services personnel, the Alameda team is headed by Port Services Officer CWO4 David Cradit, who in the case of oil spill events answers to Lt. Com. John Owens of COMNAVBASE San Francisco, who in turn works under Admiral Marrill Ruck, COMNAVBASE San Francisco Commander and the Navy's On-Scene Coordinator (NOSC) for all Bay Area oil spill and hazardous substance responses. The clearly defined chain of command goes along with highly-delineated responsibilities and jurisdictions, carefully coordinated procedures, and support agreements between the different Navy, Coast Guard, and private contractor response teams. All of which reflects one of the lessons learned from the Exxon-Valdez incident, says Cradit.

"The whole emergency response thing has changed," he says. "What they found out from Exxon-Valdez is that everybody said they could handle a major spill, but when it happened, they couldn't. So they're making everyone prepare for a worst-case scenario."

The confusion and critical delays resulting from the inadequacy and inaccessibility of equipment--much of it was simply too distantly located--and the frequent breakdowns in both communication and machinery during the Alaskan spill led to a new Federal law calling for a complete rewrite of contingency plans and a fundamental restructuring of notification and response procedures, says Cradit. In the case of Navy oil spills, these are now routinely reported to a host of Federal and State agencies, including the Coast Guard Marine Safety Office, the Office of Emergency Services, the NOSC, the National Response Center, the Department of Fish and Game, and the local Water Board, among others.

Like everyone else, NAS Alameda's team has reassessed its response capabilities in the wake of Exxon-Valdez and the resultant legislation. "It's meant a long hard look at the condition and quantity of our equipment, the training required, the regulation changes, and the actual chain of command throughout the organization," says team member ENC Todd Spaur. Reorganization is one of the most important aspects, he says. "Now everyone is responsible to everyone else, everyone know's what's going on. There are more checks and balances."

"In the Bay Area, we are ahead of the rest of the country in getting organized and complying with the new regulations," adds Cradit. "We've got the Coast Guard Strike team, all the Navy response teams, and a national stockpile of equipment in Stockton." Cradit also points to the organizational efforts and expertise of Lt. Cmdr. Owens and his staff at COMNAVBASE, whose geographic area of responsibility reaches from the southern border of Santa Clara county all the way to the northern border of Modoc county--including 12 miles out to sea. "Owens' has been the catalist that's made the Bay Area efforts so fruitful," says Cradit. "For instance, we have an excellent working relationship with the Coast Guard here."

In addition, Cradit says, NAS Alameda has unique resources that would make it invaluable in the case of a major Bay Area spill. "We have an airfield with adjacent boat ramps. They can taxi cargo planes right to the ramps and off-load equipment directly into the water. And the ramps are easily accessible to large trucks. We've got piers, the boat ramps, and an airfield all at one location."

Despite the high level of preparedness, the possibility of a major spill in San Francisco Bay, one of the nation's (and the Navy's) busiest ports, which typically would be exacerbated by strong winds and currents, remains a sobering prospect. "We've been lucky here," says team leader Mike Elsey, a long-time Port Services employee and oil spill fighter. "We haven't had a major one in the 11 years I've worked here." The biggest he can recall was around a thousand gallons, a far cry from the millions spilled in Alaska.

Still, even relatively minute spills illicit a response from the team. Oil is highly toxic, and a surprisingly small amount can contaminate a huge volume of water. "They'll call us out for a one gallon spill," says Waterfront Supervisor Mike Elsey, another member of the response team. "That's how conscientious everyone is about it." According to Cradit, "The Coast Guard has received reports of one cup of oil being spilled. Anything you can see you're supposed to report." Of the 16 Bay Area oil spills reported to the Coast Guard in the last fiscal year, 8 were reported by NAS Alameda, says Cradit. "Do we really spill more than everyone else put together? I don't believe that." Rather, it's a reflection of the conscientiousness the Navy drills into everyone concerning spills, he says. Elsey estimates the spills the team has responded to in that time altogether total only about 100-200 gallons.

Whatever the size of the spill, the initial procedures remain the same: the spill is reported to the response team (most often the report comes from the guilty vessel or observers from other ships); other authorities are notified; team investigators are sent out to determine the size of the spill, while equipment and personnel are readied. At the spill site, the prevailing currents and winds are gauged, the nature of the spill is determined, and a containment and clean-up plan is put into effect.

The kind of oil involved is an important factor, says Spaur. Heavy engine oil, for example, will move with the current, whereas diesel or jet fuel floats lightly on the surface, where it can be pushed by winds in the opposite direction of the current. Also, "Oil tends to glob up," he says. "The quicker you get there the better off you are. You can keep it all in one bunch." Generally, the best method involves using floating barriers called booms, which are pulled behind boats to corral a spill, concentrate the oil in a small area, and perhaps herd it to a calm area where some of it will naturally evaporate, and much of the rest can be cleaned up using a variety of methods. Among these are absorbent pads, about a square foot in size, which repel water while soaking up oil. These are used by the hundreds; when tied together they form what is called sweep, which is slowly dragged across the spill. Another device is an ungainly contraption called the DIP.

The 27 foot boat's full name is the Dynamic Incline Plane 3001 Oil Skimmer--which refers to the mechanical design it employs to separate the oil from the water and direct it to holding tanks. Twenty-seven feet long and weighing nearly 15,000 pounds, with the capacity to hold and transport 1500 gallons of recovered oil, the DIP has a top speed of 5 knots; its speed while skimming oil is considerably slower. But what it lacks in speed, the DIP makes up in effectiveness, says Elsey, the man in charge of running it. "It's a pretty efficient piece of gear--it'll pick up up to 94 percent of what goes through."

But the DIP requires open, fairly calm waters to be effective, as do many of the methods employed by the team. In cases of limited access and/or strong currents, says Cradit, the team's mission becomes one of directing the spill away from sensitive areas. "If there was a spill at the jetty here, our attempt would be to boom off the spill, direct the flow away from the bird sanctuaries and beaches in Alameda. We're here to minimize, mitigate the damage as much as we are to clean up the oil." Likewise, in the case of a spill at the Port of Oakland (in the channel that separates Oakland and Alameda), "the tides and currents are so strong through that estuary the oil would go right underneath the boom. So instead of trying to contain the spill, we'd put boom along all the marinas, to keep the oil out of those areas and direct to an area where we could work."

One method the team does not use involves treating a spill with chemical dispersants, which break down the chemical barrier between water and oil. "Chemicals can make the problem disappear," says Cradit, "but they don't make it go away. Dispersants work the same as dish soap. The grease is still there." And chemicals cause the oil to sink to the bottom, adds Spaur, where it can poison bottom-feeding marine life.

Whatever method is used, "Cleaning up an oil spill is extremely tedious and nasty," says Elsey. Even the threat of a substantial spill can mean long hours and days of arduous, demanding work. He recalls an incident which occurred a couple of years ago in (Sasson) Bay near Concord, involving one of the fleet of mothballed ships the Navy maintains there. "They figured there was a lot of oil that might spill from a hole in one of the ships. It was a tremendous logistics thing, involving elements from here, Mare Island, NSC Oakland. We towed the DIP up there, we sent up a response van, We took six boats....

"The water was extremely shallow. All the ships were lashed together, and we couldn't get our boats in between. So we had to go up tide and feed the boom between the ships, letting the current pull it through. We were up there for five days. We stood watches, slept on the barges that were brought in from Stockton. It was a tough week. Fortunately, most of the oil never leaked out."

Hopefully, when it comes to avoiding a major spill, the Bay Area's luck will hold. But if it doesn't, at least there's a carefully thought-out response plan--including loads of readily accessible and well-maintained equipment--and a group of dedicated, highly trained people to carry it out.